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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No: 05-2451
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
SCOTT HAYWARD,
Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
District Judge: The Honorable Alan N. Bloch
District Court No.: 02-CR-63

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 27, 2006
Before: RENDELL, SMITH, and BECKER, Circuit Judges
(Filed: April 25, 2006)

OPINION OF THE COURT

SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Scott Hayward was convicted by a jury of one count of traveling with the intent to
engage in a sexual act with a juvenile in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). He was
acquitted of a second count which charged him with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2421 by
transporting an individual in interstate commerce with the intent to engage in sexual

activity. At re-sentencing post-Booker,1 the District Court considered the conduct
underlying both counts and sentenced Hayward to 78 months, the top of the applicable
guideline range. Hayward appealed, arguing that the District Court erred by considering
the conduct of which he was acquitted.2 For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.
The government contends that the District Court did not err because the Supreme
Court determined in United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997), that a “sentencing court
may consider conduct of which a defendant has been acquitted.” Id. at 154. In the
government’s view, Watts remains good law after Booker. Several of our sister courts of
appeals agree with this view. See United States v. Vaughn, 430 F.3d 518, 526-27 (2nd
Cir. 2005); United States v. Price, 418 F.3d 771, 787-88 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297, 1304-05 (11th Cir. 2005). We find no reason to follow a
different path.
The Supreme Court explained in Watts that it was permissible to consider at
sentencing the conduct of which a defendant was acquitted. It relied upon § 3661 of the
Federal Crimes Code which “codifie[d] the longstanding principle that sentencing courts
have broad discretion to consider various kinds of information.” Watts, 519 U.S. at 151.

1

See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005) (declaring that United
States Sentencing Guidelines are only advisory).
2

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We exercise
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 327-28
(3d Cir. 2006). We exercise plenary review over questions of law concerning the
application of the sentencing guidelines. United States v. Newsome, 439 F.3d 181, 183
(3d Cir. 2006).
2

Section 3661 states that “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of
the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate
sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3661. This provision, the Watts Court pointed out, was consistent
with sentencing guideline § 1B1.4, providing that a sentencing court was not limited in
the information it could consider in imposing a sentence, as well as guideline § 1B1.3
which directs sentencing courts to consider all other related conduct. Watts, 519 U.S. at
152-53 (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 and § 1B1.4).
Although the Supreme Court was “convinced that a sentencing court may consider
conduct of which a defendant has been acquitted,” id. at 154, it reiterated that the
consideration of acquitted conduct for sentencing did not offend the Double Jeopardy
Clause as it had explained in Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995). It again
instructed that “sentencing enhancements do not punish a defendant for crimes of which
he was not convicted, but rather increase his sentence because of the manner in which he
committed the crime of conviction.” Watts, 519 U.S. at 154. Thus, a “jury’s verdict of
acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the
acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the
evidence.” Id. at 157.
In Booker, Justice Stevens’s majority opinion declared in a footnote that “none of
our prior cases,” including Witte and Watts, were “inconsistent with today's decision.”

3

543 U.S. at __, 125 S.Ct. at 754 n.2. In light of Justice Stevens's observations and the fact
that § 3661 was not invalidated by Booker, we too conclude that Watts remains good law.
Accordingly, we find no error by the District Court in considering the conduct of
which Hayward was acquitted. We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

